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1 Introduction 
1.1 The national political settlement 
Struggles to influence the balance of power and the distribution of economic resources in 
Kenya have a long history of violence: national and local, actual and threatened, physical 
and psychological.1 Somewhat controlled by sophisticated legal, administrative and political 
institutions and strongly tempered by a deep fund of intercommunity cooperation, violence 
has been kept in check, but remains persistent. The levels of violence vary from place to 
place and year to year, and seldom break out into full-scale clashes or war. Nonetheless, 
different forms of violence combine with politics to form a resilient chain that exerts powerful 
control over people’s lives and resists straightforward policy prescriptions or easy practical 
resolutions.  
 
This case study uses a definition of political settlements to frame the inquiry (Parks and Cole 
2010). This approach defines political settlements as the informal agreements that govern 
the formal negotiation and distribution of goods, rights and responsibilities within the state. 
The study aims to show one manifestation of how the political settlement in Kenya is upheld 
by a variety of interlinked forms of ‘normal’ violence, themselves linked to economic 
dependencies. Today’s political settlement is founded in the new constitution of Kenya and 
structured by the new system of devolved government. We show how the informal rules of 
the political (un)settlement in operation at the most local level play a role in sustaining a 
violent political system. 
 
Historic milestones in the development of the national political settlement include the Mau 
Mau anti-colonial movement, post-independence Africanisation led by Jomo Kenyatta, the 
end of the single party regime in 2002, and the 2007/8 democratic elections followed by 
political devolution in 2013. Each milestone has been marked by widespread violence scored 
along ethnic and class lines. In between these national events, criminal violence and low-
level dispute has tended to displace overtly political violence, but, consistently ethnicised, its 
persistence plays a political part (Obala 2012; Oyugi 2000).  
 
The current policy discourse is of institutional, economic and cultural change: a new more 
peaceful and fair order, through the ballot box, rule of law, universal education, fiscal 
responsibility and private sector growth. The new constitution, brought into effect in 2010 with 
its Bill of Rights and decentralisation of power, offers hope. Supported by the 2011 Human 
Rights Act, judicial reform and new election rules, the institutional and constitutional 
realignment is, on the face of it, directed towards reducing corruption and violence. However, 
our case study shows a different picture, in which these positive advances are held back and 
modified by the effect of persistent low-level violence in the political system. Pre- and post-
election violence in many areas of Kenya may not be hitting the headlines as it once did in 
2007/8, but it has not gone away. Instead, parts of the country appear to be in a negotiated 
lull, in which persistent violence has become unremarkable.  
 
Citizens point out police impunity and judicial tractability in sustaining the violence, even as 
they understand the difficulties faced by these underfunded and undermined institutions. In 
general people blame local and national political leaders, their business partners and shady 
criminal connections. They are also aware of their own responsibility in lining up behind 
political leaders who encourage violence, but feel that they are offered little choice. We are 
                                                             
1 Violence is ‘the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a 
group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, 
maldevelopment or deprivation’ (WHO 2002: 4). 
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arguably witnessing an as yet unresolved struggle for sovereignty that dates back to the 
post-colonial settlement of the 1960s. In the light of the Government of Kenya’s manifest 
desire to take the nation into a new era of productivity and wealth, of citizen desires for a 
well-functioning economy and peaceful society, and also in the light of continued 
international interest, we offer this case study as a contribution to a growing body of 
academic work on violence in Kenya.  
1.2 Local political settlements 
Macro- and micro-level political processes move in tandem to sustain an evolving political 
settlement. National arrangements are underscored by local behaviours that extend a web of 
power over resources and positions. Old bureaucratic and elitist continuities meet changing 
conditions that include new economic openings, new institutions of government and a 
changing landscape of crime. 
Looking specifically at violence arising from conflict, a recent study shows how violence 
works in a self-reinforcing chain (Omenya and Lubaale 2012). Another study of violence in 
Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods shows how predatory local political entrepreneurs, often 
linked to criminal outfits, create webs of power (Ruteere et al. 2013). The authors note how 
these actors gain power from the poverty of residents in the areas in which they operate. In 
this case study we propose to add more citizen-focused evidence to this argument, to show 
how a chain of violence maintains a violent political settlement in an area far from the capital 
city.  
It appears that whatever reformed institutional structures are put in place, the system of 
violence adapts to fit. A positive change in reducing violence in one part of the system often 
seems to be rapidly overwhelmed by the rule still operating undisturbed in other parts of the 
system. One explanation for this is that the tendency for leaders to accumulate wealth while 
in power has deep roots and resilient networks, even as some committed leaders fight for a 
fairer system (Wrong 2009). Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999) advance the idea that the 
functioning of many states in Africa is underpinned by such roots; rhizomes of kleptocracy 
that began to grow in colonial times, extended in the fertile ground of post-colonial 
nationalism and fed over the decades on ‘extraversion’. These rhizomes of hidden and 
informal power reach below the formal well-mannered surface, growing outwards from elite 
incumbents in national institutions, penetrating layers of local leaders (administrators, police 
chiefs, criminal bosses, business interests), and creating a web of relations among the 
millions of poor people who are crucial voters in Africa’s democracies. This violence-inflected 
political settlement creates and thrives on insecurity and poverty as much as it enjoys wealth 
and progress (Ruteere et al. 2013). It is held in place by a web of agents who subsist on the 
rents that can be gained by ever-hardening social and geographic divisions (Watson 2010).  
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2 Case study purpose and methodology 
2.1 Case selection 
It is not widely acknowledged that both the very powerful and the relatively powerless use 
violence chains to maintain and reproduce the political settlement. While national level 
aspects of the political settlement and its associated violence are relatively well known, and 
the formal operations and shortcomings of institutions such as parliament, line ministries, 
large companies, the judiciary and the police are relatively well understood, there is less 
work clarifying the part played by poor people. Various authors argue that politics is too often 
understood as a solely national level project (De Smedt 2009; Landau and Misago 2009). 
This leads to a focus on political elites, emphasising the influence of high-level politicians 
without recognising the agency of other levels of power. Other studies show the link between 
elite power and the bureaucracy; for example, Hassan (2013) has shown how the 
entrenchment of an authoritarian bureaucracy in Kenya has defied the formal rule change of 
the constitution to maintain pre-existing interests. 
 
Existing approaches to policy aiming for peaceful political settlements do not sufficiently 
engage with the role of ordinary citizens in forging and transforming the emerging political 
and social order. Consequently, policy recommendations miss strategic points of influence 
and engagement. We want to understand what part endemic violence at the micro level plays 
in the current political settlement. We would like to understand if the Bayart et al. (1999) 
‘rhizomatous informal state’ is in operation in relation to persistent violence, and if so, how 
does it work? For Kenyans who want change, the policy challenge is to influence the actors 
and actions that hold informal arrangements in place at the micro as well as at the macro 
level.  
 
This case study focuses on Marsabit, a small town that lies some 200km south of the Kenya–
Ethiopia border in Kenya’s arid north. We selected the town as a site of high tension, where 
violence has been a serious problem for many years. For the sake of the people who live 
there, the question as to why it persists, despite years of effort on the part of citizens, 
leaders, government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donors, demands an 
answer.  
 
The case has the potential to pose questions about the political, administrative and economic 
system of Kenya as a whole. To add to other case studies of micro-level violence in Kenya 
that have looked at the slum areas of the big cities (Ruteere et al. 2013; Ruteere 2011; 
Ruteere and Pommerole 2003), this case also looks at another place on the margins, but this 
time a territorial and climatic margin. All these studies show how day-to-day threats can tip 
over into severe nastiness, as well as how violence can bubble along below the surface of 
national consciousness in areas that are far (physically or mentally) from the main political 
and economic centres; and as many Kenyans will attest, Marsabit is by no means the only 
marginal place where quotidian violence is a normal hazard of everyday life.  
 
The study voices the perspective of Marsabit townspeople. It pulls together an interpretation 
of events from the accounts of a range of differently positioned citizens, few of whom occupy 
elite positions. It shows what people believe and how they act in response to these beliefs. 
We penetrate the generalisations that are commonly made about ‘marginalised people’ in 
Kenya, demystifying ‘ethnic community’ by showing the divisions within groups and their lack 
of uniformity on the question of violence. Notwithstanding these insights, the study is also 
alert to commonalities that arise from poor people’s difficult position in a powerful political 
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system. We demonstrate why conventional efforts to resolve violence in Marsabit have been 
less than successful.  
2.2 Method 
Our method involved two stages: scoping through an informal ‘listening’ method, followed by 
deep conversations with people from different communities, of different ages and genders, to 
explore the day-to-day reality of violence in their experience. To tackle the biases and ethical 
dangers of what could be potentially divisive questions, we used a method of triangulation 
and sampling along with high levels of confidentiality. It began with a listening approach in 
which our group of six researchers spent three days walking around different areas of town, 
meeting local people, shopkeepers, people in small restaurants, teachers and other 
professionals, young people hanging out on street corners, people gathered at a public 
meeting and so on, speaking to as many people as possible and hearing what they were 
saying about violence in the area. This allowed us to get a view of townspeople’s views on 
the subject, and to make decisions about how to structure more in-depth discussions with a 
selected sample. In this way we met with approximately 60 people.  
 
From this first stage we selected a spectrum of people to join a series of seven small focus 
groups of 4–6 people, in which structured private discussions gave us the chance to explore 
events, explanations and beliefs and then to compare one group with another. The 30 people 
in the seven focus groups were stratified by ethnic group and gender—these being the two 
main divisions that we had understood at the listening stage would affect how comfortable 
people felt to speak. Our approach was to ask two questions: ‘What kind of persistent 
violence is there?’; and ‘Why does it persist?’ Apart from probing for clarification of incidents 
and their contexts, these were all the questions that we needed to open up a detailed 
exploration of patterns of current events.  
 
We also requested and undertook interviews with a small number of administrators, as well 
as NGO leaders and political players. All our respondents were people who deal with, suffer 
from, try to live with, and occasionally take part in or support violence. The data thus 
generated has been strongly consistent. All the claims we make in this report come from the 
focus group discussions and interviews. Each claim has been given to us by a reasonable 
proportion of the people we met (in most cases by the overwhelming majority).  
2.3 Caveats 
This study is not a large one and claims to raise issues and insights, but not to represent the 
population. By focusing on the single question of violence, there is a tendency for the issue 
to take on enormous proportions, as if violence is all that is happening in Marsabit. There are 
many days, weeks, even months when nothing violent happens. Nonetheless all of our 
interlocutors thought that the issue of persistent and unresolved violence was important and 
worrying. We attempted to overcome the problem of exaggeration by probing for the context 
of every claim and triangulating – where, when, who, has it happened before, has it 
happened elsewhere, what else happened? The importance of the method is that it tells us 
what a range of people think is going on and their perspective on causes and effects. It gives 
a space for these perceptions to be aired and given due consideration in seeking ways of 
resolving the problem.  
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3 Profile of Marsabit 
 
Marsabit town lies 550km north of Nairobi and 200km south of the Kenya–Ethiopia border. 
Capital of Marsabit County’s 71,000 square kilometres of arid territory, the town nests in the 
saddle of a mountain clothed with forest that rises steeply above vast rangelands. The 
forests were once valuable dry season grazing for pastoralists (until they became too 
dangerous) and the town has become increasingly important in the economy and politics of 
the area. It has long been one of the epicentres of competition for economic and political 
resources. Since the early years of the twentieth century, the town has attracted 
entrepreneurs, administrators, farmers, politicians, livestock traders, ex-pastoralists, 
insurgents and, increasingly, unemployed young people and families moving away from 
insecurity in the rangelands. The latest census figure for the county is 291,166, of which 
64,000 are in urban areas, the majority in Marsabit town and, to a lesser extent, Moyale town 
on the Kenya–Ethiopia border.2  
Figure 3.1 Map of Kenya 
  
Source: Adapted from Nations Online (2014)  
 
During British colonial rule, this large, sparsely populated expanse of territory received the 
barest of government investment. After independence in 1963, the pattern of 
underinvestment continued. Nonetheless, as time went on, as the population of people and 
livestock grew, trading centres were established, boreholes drilled and administrative posts 
set up in the increasingly subdivided territory (Watson 2010). People came to settle and farm 
on the well-watered mountain slopes. By the 1990s, the mountain land and the town’s goods 
and rents were claimed by a fractious mix of different groups: Borana, Burji, Gabra, Rendille, 
                                                             
2 See Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2009) 
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Ariaal, Samburu and Turkana. They became the business people who stocked its shops and 
market stalls and provided services, the administrators in its government offices, the students 
who thronged its growing number of schools, the farmers who tilled its fields, the charcoal 
burners in the forest, and importantly for our story, the politicians and their militias who, many 
claim, still incite its violence. While there had been less than 1,000 Borana in Marsabit town 
in the 1960s, by 1979 Borana numbered 30,444, outstripping Gabra (23,410) and Rendille 
(19,856).3 
 
Major droughts in the 1970s and 1980s brought aid agencies to the region. Along with 
established Christian missions, they set up relief distribution points in the growing 
settlements (Fratkin and Roth 2005). By 1985 aid agencies were also funding major farming 
programmes as an alternative to pastoralism, which they believed was an impoverished way 
of life. Settlement on the mountain was a response to both insecurity in the rangelands and 
to the economic potential of the mountain.  
 
For much of the twentieth century politics were expressed in customary relations between 
the major ethnic groups, the larger of which spanned the international border. Their 
consistent raiding of one another was tempered by successive negotiations and agreements 
and a system of justice and compensation. These disputes and agreements were economic 
and territorial, in some ways no different from the rivalry, conflict and treaties of neighbouring 
states.  
 
At Kenya’s independence new borders and boundaries and new administrative 
arrangements set the scene for a change in the locus of rivalry and power. Politics became 
ever more important as administrative boundaries and political borders cut across the 
rangelands and created possibilities for patronage, rents and exclusions (Watson 2010; 
Galaty 2005). Two constituencies were formed to send Members of Parliament (MPs) to join 
the new government in Nairobi. Marsabit North was mainly Borana and Gabra, and South 
was primarily Rendille. Wars still broke out between different ethnic alliances, operating 
according to the old rules of territorial invasion and theft of livestock, but now tinted with 
external as well as internal politics. In 1988, with pressure from political leaders, Marsabit 
North was subdivided into North Horr and Saku reflecting Gabra and Borana interests 
respectively. Rather than reducing conflict between tribes, however, the division ‘brought 
more tribal problems,’ as one interviewee put it, as competition for the power and resources 
in the gift of the Member of Parliament became more intense. There was violence from 
1994–6 between Burji and Borana, in 1996/7 between Rendille and Borana and from 2003–8 
between Gabra and Borana.   
 
In today’s politics, as one local resident explains ‘it is numbers that matter.’ Mandated in 
2010 by the new constitution and coming into local force after elections in March 2013, 
Marsabit County is the latest in a series of centrally-mandated boundary-setting exercises. 
The new county embraces four constituencies and four administrative districts. Political 
groups, whose logic of membership has long been ethnicity, were concerned with how to 
dominate the new political structures, and thereby not be left out of the rents and patronage 
that would come with the decentralised budgets and the senatorial influence in Nairobi. In the 
run-up to elections to the county government the general assumption was that Borana voters 
would be in the majority. Winning groups could expect power over many of the resources 
coming to the region (primarily government salaries and contracts), as well as to hold 
considerable influence in relation to other resources, such as aid and private sector contracts 
and, for some, the fruits of criminal activities. Some of the smaller ethnic groups, each of 
whom constituted a political voting bloc, formed an alliance. They drew on an old alliance 
that had been initiated a decade before to overcome Borana dominance in the powerful 
teachers’ union, the Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT). This alliance was made up 
                                                             
3 For further information please see Government of Kenya 1979 Census (cited in Fratkin and Roth 2005) 
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of Rendille, Gabra and Burji and was called REGABU. In 2013, the REGABU alliance was 
revived and put forward shared candidates for each post in the gubernatorial and senatorial 
elections: they swept the board. Borana politicians, finding themselves out of power for the 
first time in decades, cried foul.  
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4 Violence chains 
 
In the following sections we will enumerate some of the forms of violence that were prevalent 
in Marsabit in 2013, beginning with what people call ‘innocent killings’. We will demonstrate 
how local people describe and understand these and other kinds of violence, before 
developing an analysis that attempts to explain their persistence. We begin with a brief 
description, supported by quotations taken from the focus groups and interviews, to sum up 
the incidents we heard about, cautioning again that while dreadfully familiar, they are not 
every day. We calculate some 28 unexplained murders and perhaps 200 deaths in violent 
attacks over the last five years: 
 
‘Two children are walking along a dusty road, thick acacia scrub clustering close on 
either side. A shot rings out and they are left dead where they fall. A woman and her 
child are beaten as they walk home along an unlit stretch of road in Marsabit town, a 
plastic bag of groceries lies scattered on the ground. Before dawn in Moyale, a town 
on the Kenya–Ethiopia border, a house goes up in flames and then another and 
another, automatic gunfire clatters, many are killed. Families grab what they can and 
run for the Ethiopian side. A truckload of stolen cows rumbles northwards across the 
same border unhindered by border officials. A noisy group are marching towards the 
district commissioner’s office on Marsabit Mountain, carrying the corpse of a young 
man, killed in the forest by unknown assailants. One of the demonstrators throws a 
stone, windows break, the riot spreads to town and young people tear the wooden 
doors of shops and the looting begins. In a back room of a three-storey hotel and 
shopping complex, one of the largest buildings in town, a group of men meet in 
conclave. At a formal ‘investment’ meeting at the Moi Girls’ High School, a politician 
denounces the county government, men and women from his tribe in the audience 
bring out placards marked ‘NO PEACE’ and then walk out en masse.’  
4.1 ‘Innocent killings’ 
People’s stories mostly begin with the ‘innocent killings’. Innocent people, often children and 
women, are killed without explanation and with no clear motive. Nothing is stolen. The people 
killed have done nothing wrong and the perpetrators are never found. 
 
‘My son had passed his final primary school examination. He was waiting to join 
secondary school. He killed by bandits on Hula Hula road. They stole nothing from 
him. Banditry is a common thing, but nowadays they just kill and take away nothing 
from their victims. Many people have been killed while walking to or from the market 
or in the forest when they go to collect firewood - people just ambush and kill them on 
their way.’  
 
‘Several people were killed by unknown assailants especially along the Badasa road 
and Hula Hula roads. In most of these attacks people hide in the forest and time 
people who are passing by they then attack them or kill them.’  
 
‘There was an incident in Songa where four children who were on their way to a 
church camp were shot and killed. The attackers were not known. There was another 
incident in which people who were coming from Songa to town with some children 
were attacked and killed on the way by unknown assailants.’  
 
‘Go to those villages and ask them how many are widows. Whoever does that comes 
through the forest.’  
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Combining all the data and avoiding double counting, we calculate that at least 28 people of 
all different ethnicities, one-third of them children, have lost their lives in this mysterious way 
since 2009. Two, perhaps three, were tortured, but most were just shot. The timing of these 
incidents are not particularly clustered around times of political tension; instead people speak 
of them as being spaced apart and happening at times when there is ‘peace’ – one or two, 
then, later in the year, another one. In the last six months the ethnic group and location of the 
killings has changed, with a number of inexplicable killings taking place in a Turkana 
community.  
 
This form of unexplained violence is tragic for the victims and their families, and it also has a 
broader insidious significance. Local people understand the killings as a means of political 
communication, and they appear to have been accepted without undue concern at high 
levels of the administration: people see it as inevitable. Even though elder-led peace and 
justice declarations such as those of Modogashe–Garissa (2001) and Maikona–Walda 
(2008) have been widely admired for elaborating clearly how such crimes should be followed 
up by citizens and police and treated in the traditional and state courts, the agreements do 
not seem to have worked to prevent or resolve Marsabit town’s innocent killings. In a study in 
2010, in an examination of the effect of the Maikona–Walda Declaration on peace in the 
district, it was already clear that while it was working in the rural areas, it was not doing so 
well in the urban areas (Scott-Villiers et al. 2011). In 2013, our respondents explained that 
killings have become a part of the cycle of democratic politics, immune to civil-customary 
declarations.  
4.2 Small wars 
Small wars are a second form of violence troubling the people of Marsabit County. In July 
2005 in the trading post of Turbi, on the road between Marsabit and Moyale, 60 people were 
massacred, 22 of them children. According to an account collected by Mwangi, in 2006, 
some 1,000 heavily armed fighters surrounded the trading centre and sprayed the primary 
school with bullets, murdering eight pupils in their morning classes. Women were hacked to 
death; an infant’s head was smashed on a rock. Two administration policemen and three 
home guards tried to protect the civilians until their ammunition gave out. During the raid over 
12,000 head of livestock were stolen. Not long after, in a revenge attack on members of the 
tribe that were blamed for the massacre, ten members of a church group were hacked and 
speared to death at Bubisa, 80km away (Mwangi 2006). Prior to the massacre at Turbi, local 
leaders had been anticipating an attack, which is why most of the young and middle-aged 
men were not in Turbi at the time. An MP had held a press conference a few weeks before 
the atrocity, begging the central government to send the elite General Service Unit of the 
Kenya Army to the area. He accused other politicians of ‘using the OLF [Oromia Liberation 
Front] to kill his people’ (ibid.: 86). Others believe to this day that this insurgent group from 
Ethiopia were involved. The administration did not take preventive action. The massacre was 
just one incident in a war that had been going on since at least 2003. Local elders managed, 
in 2008, to bring a ceasefire, but it was an unsteady peace.  
 
‘The violence here is tribal and is deeply rooted. For example, one time there was war 
between the Burji and Borana - which resulted in many people being killed. There are 
deeply rooted divisions between the different ethnic communities living here and that 
is the major source of violence. Unfortunately people are not willing to share 
information or report criminals to the police because they are their kinsmen.’  
 
‘There is a group in town that is financed by politicians. When it is close to elections, 
politicians according to the tribe... if the politician is Burji, Borana, Rendille, he will 
send the group to kill one of the members. They kill one of their own, then the 
members of that community will say it’s the other community who have killed one of 
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our own, then they send their people out of the town. Then the politician from one of 
the three [gets his votes]...’ 
 
‘Out of every killing, a certain politician gains… In this town, there are thugs that are 
financed by politicians. The thugs that kill people do not want anything else but 
money. They are paid and told who to kill. The politicians are from any tribe and they 
do the same. They play their games so as to win elections.’ 
 
In December 2011 fighting broke out in rural areas of Moyale district on the border with 
Ethiopia. Blame was soon flying between leaders who used ethnicity to define the dispute. 
Fields of ripe maize were burned and, according to media reports, 8,000 people fled into 
Ethiopia.4 Throughout 2012 and 2013 there were a number of severe incidents in Moyale 
town. One estimate suggested that 100 people died over that year, and this seems 
consistent with media reports of specific incidents over that period. In July 2012, armed 
militias were involved in attacking two villages on the Ethiopian side, close to Moyale town. 
Houses were burned, at least 20 died and 20,000 people fled into Kenya.5 In August 2013, 
after the Marsabit County elections, Moyale town went up in flames again. The arsonists’ 
clan was asked to compensate. They replied that they wanted to see large numbers of a 
particular ethnic group leave the town. They claimed that this other group had entered town 
on the invitation of local politicians just prior to elections to pad the voting lists. There were 
revenge attacks and other groups were also caught up in the violence. On 28 August 2013 it 
was estimated that at least 20 people had died in that month alone.6 The troubles continued 
until the Kenya Army arrived in September 2013, some six months after the clashes had 
begun. Violence flared again in December 2013 and January 2014, when nine people died 
including two children.7 People were concerned about how long it took the government to 
react: they said it was not until a national opposition leader came to Moyale that the central 
government sent in the army. The police had apparently stood by as spectators watching the 
town burn. Each of the different groups explain that, for more than a decade, Moyale town 
has been the site of violence instigated by unscrupulous leaders.  
 
‘There was killing on both sides. Marsabit County assembly members even went to 
Moyale and when we were there you could hear gunshots and see houses burning. 
That was August. There were allegations between politicians. Until the army were 
brought in. People were displaced to Ethiopia. Usually that destruction of properties 
does not happen. The problem [in Moyale] is not resolved up to this time. When we 
went there we were going to have a ceasefire, but people accused us of fanning the 
flames of the fire.’  
 
‘That other group are the ones who cause war and they do not want to participate in 
peace meetings.’ 
 
Small wars are a part of the pattern of unresolved and persistent violence in Marsabit 
County. The wars and the incitement are made more complex by the international border, 
across which perpetrators and victims move with ease. In the same way that it fails to 
investigate and bring the perpetrators of innocent killings to justice, the failure of the 
government to resolve small wars indicates, in the minds of the citizens, a form of approval. 
Political leaders make mileage from wars and people see them being rewarded for their 
belligerence.  
                                                             
4 www.irinnews.org/report/94681/kenya-thousands-remain-displaced-as-fighting-subsides-in-moyale.  
5 www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19028609. 
6 http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00026137.html. 
7 http://allafrica.com/stories/201402030521.html.  
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4.3 Economic boycotts and hate speech 
Another element of the violence chain is economic boycott, which although apparently a legal 
sanction, is linked to forms of incitement and sometimes to what could be interpreted as hate 
speech.  
 
‘Education should have broadened our people’s minds and they become open, but of 
late it’s making them ask why does not my community own this or dominate that 
community? They ask why has that community got all the lorries? They start seeing 
exploitation, hegemony, and asking why is my community being oppressed? This 
ethnic consciousness is among the youth. They ask more strongly than among older 
people. It's not so much to do with employment, but why is our man not the 
governor?’ 
 
In March 2013, after the success of the REGABU alliance in the county elections, the new 
leaders took up their new posts. By September 2013, leaders of the opposing ethnic group 
were making it known to citizens of Marsabit town that the new arrangements were not 
satisfactory. They instructed their supporters to stop buying from the shops of one of the 
groups belonging to the coalition, or selling to them, or working for them. They claimed that 
this ethnic group had never bought from anybody else’s shops in the past and that the 
boycott was a measured response to an unfair situation. At the time of our visit, the boycott 
was hitting this small group hard, as their economic standing in the town is primarily based 
on small business. It was also affecting poor people regardless of their tribe. In effect, the 
boycott actually extended across all groups: 
 
‘A political leader told [us] in a baraza [public meeting] that we should not let [other 
people] use our water. They should not even transport milk belonging to the Gabra to 
the market. This is because they own the public service vehicles. In another public 
meeting it was agreed that [that group] should not buy from [certain] shops. It was 
also agreed that [the group] should not sell charcoal to the [other groups]. Since then, 
[they] do not buy from [the others] and vice versa. Women from [that group] do not 
sell charcoal to the [others]. They only sell to their fellow [tribespeople]. The leaders 
held meetings and agreed that people, both young and old, from [their] community 
would supervise the economic boycott. There is a woman who bought from a shop 
and was beaten up. This was... on 12 October this year. It is politics that brings up all 
these things… It is the political leaders who bring these up. People here listen to their 
political leaders and do what the leaders tell them to.’ 
 
As the boycott continued, the businesses of the boycotting group began to do well, while the 
businesses of the small group who had joined the ruling coalition started to fail. Some of their 
butcheries closed; eateries and general stores began to have trouble. One observer pointed 
out that the primary beneficiaries of the policy were local opposition political leaders, who 
were also the owners of some of the larger businesses in town. Smaller businesses on the 
boycotting side, such as charcoal sellers who relied on a mixed clientele, and the farm 
labourers who were expected to give up their jobs or leave their rental houses were not so 
happy. They could not afford to stop doing business with the other side. Some risked 
ignoring the leaders’ orders: a woman and child were beaten for shopping in the wrong shop.  
 
‘It is the leaders who benefit. Like now those women are suffering because they are 
not allowed to sell their charcoal. They do not get food for their children yet their 
leaders are living a good life.’ 
 
‘It has been a month since we stopped buying from them and they have regretted. 
Their butcheries have closed down. Their hotels have been closed too. Let them feel 
that for two or three months, then we see what happens.’ 
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On 11 October 2013 the new governor called an Investor Conference at one of the high 
schools in Marsabit town. He argued that now was the time to attract investment to the 
county, not to be arguing over election results. However, opposition political leaders had 
organised supporters to disrupt the meeting. Several accounts tell how one of the MPs stood 
up and called for the meeting to close, because, he said, while Moyale was at war, no 
investment could take place in Marsabit County. Participants from the opposition side 
brought out placards, indicating that there was no peace and there was corruption in 
government. The MP then left the meeting and most of the opposition group participants 
followed him. Similarly, ten days later at the Mashujaa Day celebrations the opposition 
citizens and their political leaders also walked out.  
 
‘When the meeting had started at Moi Girls’ High School, members of the county 
assembly were given a chance to speak one after the other. Different members of 
parliament from the county were also given a chance to speak. The Member of 
Parliament for Moyale woke up to speak then followed the deputy governor. When 
the governor stood to speak then the people got out their placards and raised them 
on the air. The governor said, “I am the one who got votes and I am the one who will 
rule for five years. I got votes fairly.” Our people said that the governor has shown us 
that he has the power and that there is no employment, and no equal sharing of the 
county resources.’  
 
‘During the Mashujaa Day celebrations the community showed hatred. When the 
governor’s speech was being read they walked out. They do not fear the governor 
and they do not want him. They also said that they do not want investors in the 
county because there is no peace.’ 
 
‘It is the politicians who instigate violence and conflict among people here. They 
propagate hate speech. They talk against other communities. Every day people go to 
the chief's office to report this speech.’ 
 
By November 2013 people in Marsabit town were in a state of acute tension after these 
events. Neighbours were not speaking to one another and many felt that at any moment 
violence might flare up as it had done in Moyale. 
 
‘We are feeling that there is not an adequate distribution of resources. Anything could 
trigger violence now. It could result from a murder, or two people fighting, or the 
announcement of results of government appointments. We are not buying from each 
other’s shops or renting rooms in each other’s houses. Now we are marrying only 
from our own group.’ 
 
‘Some of the neighbours are not even greeting each other. The way the members of 
the different communities were relating has changed. People are not as social as they 
were before.’ 
 
The organisers of the boycott argue that it is legal. Yet, when the action is considered within 
the overall system of political intimidation, especially at times of heightened tension, it takes 
on a different cast. The speeches that are allegedly made in calling for the boycott sound 
more chilling. On the surface they are innocuous but just below the surface they seem to 
have a double meaning of incitement. At the height of the tension, posts on social media 
sites and short message service (SMS) exchanges also had a sense of double meaning. 
This kind of speech treads a fine legal line. A Kenyan advocate has defined hate speech as 
‘speech that advocates or encourages violent acts against a specific group, and creates a 
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climate of hate or prejudice, which may in turn foster the commission of hate crimes.’8 During 
our short visit to Marsabit we heard a considerable amount of speech from every group that 
could fall into this category. We heard suggestions and statements indicating that other 
groups may be killed, that ‘our’ group is being targeted and must now retaliate, that this 
group hates that group, that the group over there brought the violence, that this group is 
provoking violence, that the other group thinks that they are the only people and that all 
others are not people at all, that this or that act shows hatred, and that ‘God has created us 
to be leaders and not those others’. It follows that as tensions rise, so the conditions for hate 
speech become conducive and more dangerous. The significance of the economic boycott 
and divisive speech in the violence chain is precisely in its liminal legality: it is double speak; 
it damages, it may foment further violence, but it is legal and no one seems able to stop it. 
Even religious leaders take part. It is as if it has the official approval of leaders and there is 
barely anyone who does not indulge.  
 
The role of rumour in African politics has long been recognised, and politicians have always 
made good use of it to undermine opponents. In times of crisis, people need to rely on 
hearsay to obtain valuable information that may help them survive (Osborn 2008). Across 
Kenya in 2007/8, lack of information and rumour was a primary cause of increasing fear and 
tension during the post-election violence. Rumours shape public perceptions of the state of 
affairs and can thus inform and/or mobilise people to take action. Present-day technology 
enables rumours to spread quickly through text messages.  
 
In this section we have enumerated some of the forms of persistent violence that were under 
discussion in Marsabit town in late 2013. Without much prompting, people in each focus 
group described innocent killings, small wars, the economic boycott and divisive speech in 
detail. They explained it as political power and showed how one kind of violence encouraged 
the other. In Section 5 we will consider different responses to the violence and ask whether 
the responses contribute to resolution. 
                                                             
8 www.cohesion.or.ke/index.php/media-centre/news/144-unpacking-hate-speech-by-commissioner-milly-odongo. 
15 
 
5 Responses by government and citizens 
5.1 Administration action 
 
‘The government is aware of what is happening but it is doing nothing.’ 
 
In January 2014, two years after the start of the Moyale clashes and ten months after the 
county elections and the subsequent tension, Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya’s president, repudiated 
Marsabit’s political leaders of all stripes for their failure to resolve the clashes in Moyale and 
mandated the army to be sent in again. Our respondents told us that it is normal for 
authorities to intervene very late, by which time the effect of the violence has already done 
much work. Some people went so far as to opine that it would suit the centre, were 
Marsabit’s government to collapse, since there is a school of thought that the central 
government would rather see devolution fail and power return to the centre. 
 
The president’s website posted the following on 5 February 2014: 
 
‘“My administration will not sit back and watch as insecurity reigns. It is your 
responsibility to ensure peace in the county,” the President told the leaders. President 
Kenyatta spoke today at State House Nairobi during a meeting with Marsabit leaders. 
He said the negotiations are the last chance his Government is giving the leaders of 
Marsabit to end the conflict, saying the leaders cannot be allowed to continue 
bickering while citizens continue losing lives. The President assured the leaders that 
the Government will provide an office and a secretariat to facilitate the negotiations. 
He warned that if the negotiations fail, all measures will be taken to ensure peace 
returns to Marsabit, including presenting a proposal to Parliament on how that should 
be done. “But if you agree to end the conflict, the national government will work out a 
plan to make Marsabit a model county,” President Kenyatta said.’9 
 
Notwithstanding presidential censure, Marsabit citizens feel that local authorities do too little 
to confront the violence. Rather than understanding local authorities as bodies that could act 
on violence, it seems that people think they are bound up in it. They explain that the new 
devolved county government is balanced between the powers of the governor and county 
assembly on the one hand, and the centrally controlled administration, as represented by the 
chiefs, district officers, district commissioners and county commissioner, on the other: 
  
‘There is a lot of tension between the county commissioner and the governor over 
power. It is not clear to many people who, between the governor and commissioner, 
is in charge of the county. But because the commissioner controls the security 
apparatus he has more power but he is misusing the security officers. During 
Mashujaa Day it was the county commissioner who read the president’s speech 
instead of the governor who is not only superior but who is popularly elected by the 
people of Marsabit County.’ 
 
‘We used to do barazas [public meetings] with the chief and suchlike when there was 
a problem. Now they don’t call them because the leaders are not on good terms. 
When they do public barazas before, you would accept what was said. The nyumba 
kumi [ten house] baraza [a new government security initiative where households are 
asked to watch each other] was the first for a while. But they have not solved the 
problem between the leaders. They have announced that I may not talk with my 
                                                             
9 www.president.go.ke/marsabit-leaders-given-one-week-to-resolve-conflict-in-the-county/. 
16 
 
neighbour so how will nyumba kumi work? In my village we tried nyumba kumi, but no 
one came together. How do you start? Wana kata [we are split]. We do not even talk 
to each other!’ 
 
‘A few chiefs and sub-chiefs are also notorious – one even abused the DO [district 
officer] who is his senior in public – these chiefs and sub-chiefs are the ones used to 
mobilise people and pass messages to villagers, to block the administration from 
knowing what is happening and organising the attacks. They also get a share of the 
proceeds or cut from politicians.’ 
 
‘The government does not look at its people. We as women cannot go to the 
governor. We are told that there is no chance to see him.’ 
 
‘The people here fear the government. If the government would take a little action 
people would fear. A few days ago, a district officer’s office was burnt down in 
Moyale, but nothing was done by the government about it. Arrests were made but the 
people arrested were gotten out of the police cells. Even the police OCS [officer 
commanding station] had to escape via Garissa. The politicians who incite people 
should be arrested. Otherwise, we shall always be fighting.’ 
 
Ordinary people claim that members of the administration rely on elected politicians to keep 
their positions. They argue that business people also rely on elected politicians for access to 
lucrative contracts and in return they give politicians liquidity for winning elections. Poor 
people, voting in ethnically defined blocs, provide another side of the equation. Thus, as our 
respondents explained repeatedly, it is not surprising that the administration does not solve 
the killings and wars.  
5.2 Police investigations 
The police are the subject of almost universal criticism among the population of the 
mountain. They may put up a search for killers, but by most accounts they seldom find the 
perpetrators and more often than not the search is half-hearted. Some suspect that the 
police themselves may be partisan. On the other hand, it is also well understood that raiders 
are often armed with sophisticated weapons, whereas the police are not well armed or 
equipped. Local people understand their fear of going into violent situations. A third 
accusation levelled at the police is that they are simply corrupt. Some accuse them of selling 
guns and selling ‘protection’. Whether partisan, corrupt, or simply ill-equipped, their weak 
performance contributes to the system of violence.  
 
‘I worked in the first government by Jomo Kenyatta as a police officer. If we heard of 
any gunshots, even if it were 500km from here, we would rush there to see what it 
was about and recover the gun. Right now, we hear gunshots here, but no one takes 
action.’  
 
‘It really upsets when a community loses some of its people and fails to get satisfied 
with where thought they would get help from. Most times, people do not get any 
feedback from the police. It gets to a point where people no longer go to the police, 
but instead they take revenge. If the help from the government was reliable, where 
the killers would be arrested, then the communities would be satisfied and such 
revenge would not be common.’ 
 
‘When such incidents happen, the police move around where they think the 
perpetrators are for two to three days. They do not tell the communities anything. 
That is what makes most communities not to trust the police. They even think that the 
police are part of the killings. If a Borana is killed, for example, and the police suspect 
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Rendille have done it, they come to the Rendille and harass them. One morning, a 
lorry would come to the Rendille manyatta [village] full of police officers. They would 
beat up man, women and children in the manyatta forcing them to say who the 
culprits are. I don’t know if the same happens to the Borana, but this has taken place 
with the Rendille several times. They force you to tell the person who killed, yet the 
killings are done in the forest and we don’t know the perpetrators.’  
 
The police searches are often made with the help of ‘home guards’ who are local men 
officially allowed to carry arms (allegedly sold to them at a large profit by the police). Home 
guards are chosen by local communities and are more widely trusted to act quickly and with 
more effort. Home guards also keep a watch on some of the more dangerous stretches of 
road, and are generally praised for their role. However, they only have limited capabilities 
and they are often accused of contributing to clashes themselves. 
 
‘Since villagers do not feel protected by the government they have now taken security 
into their own – they use police reservists and vigilante groups to provide their own 
security. As a precaution children and women are not allowed to go out at night.’ 
 
‘The police are so sunk in corruption, so much decay. During 2006/7 a trend occurred 
that you would invade her village, Borana could go and cause problems to Gabra and 
Borana would bribe the administration for protection, then the Gabra would go and 
pay the administration for protection. The administration became rich. They build 
palatial homes. They think they are being banished when they are assigned to this 
place, but when they get here they realise they can make money. The guns they can 
get they sell to KRP [Kenya Police Reserve or home guards] for KShs 50,000 - no 
receipt. They are supposed to be given to home guards for free. The county is 70,000 
square km. This town is the epicentre of the conflict. The elites contribute.’ 
 
For the ‘innocent killings’ there is almost never a conviction by a court. With a few 
exceptions, people believe that the courts barely play a role in confronting the violence that 
haunts the mountain and its surrounding rangelands and vital connecting roads.  
 
‘According to information that we got is that some politicians bribed the magistrate. 
They did this to gain the trust and votes of one of the communities. They bribed the 
court to change the case. The police did their work but the court was compromised.’ 
 
The role of the police and policing in Kenya is still a topic that is under-researched, in 
particular how ordinary police officers perceive their own roles and how that informs their 
actions. Ruteere and Pommerole describe how Kenyan citizens perceive the police as the 
instrument for maintaining a certain order and representing the interests of certain groups 
and individuals (2003: 592). This perception has accumulated since the colonial regime, 
during which police recruitment was ethnicised—from ethnic communities less opposed to 
the colonial government. Ruteere (2011) points at various factors that explain police 
behaviour, suggesting that the police are not simply an extended arm of the state. They have 
a level of autonomy, particularly at lower levels, in taking law and order decisions. The police 
are state actors, but also individuals with multiple identities that inform how they exercise 
power. 
 
The failure of formal state security and justice bodies to tackle the problem of political killings 
is significant in the eyes of all our respondents. It demonstrates to citizens and leaders alike 
that the state accepts the message and the medium of the killers. Their silence on the role of 
customary systems of justice is also significant. With no faith in formal institutions, people 
adapt to the violence: women and children try not to go out at night and home guards keep a 
watch on the road.  
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5.3 Civic efforts 
Among ordinary people in Marsabit there is appreciation for, but a low degree of confidence 
in, the anti-violence efforts of civic groups and NGOs. While most people speak of the good 
effect of peace declarations brokered by customary leaders and supported by government 
and NGOs, they explain that these declarations are not working to resolve persistent political 
violence. People are aware that some elders have had a role in slowing small wars and 
preventing one-off crimes from becoming cycles of politicised revenge, but they have also 
been saying for some time that the declarations cannot resolve political violence whose 
origins lie in urban areas (Scott-Villiers et al. 2011). The declarations, based on customary 
law in an awkward marriage with state law, are suited to the kinds of crime and tension that 
are subject to the authority of elders. They are weaker in towns than in the countryside by 
virtue of the different structures of authority in urban settings. Many people mentioned the 
declarations, but only in order to point out that they were not working in Marsabit or Moyale 
towns.  
 
Other efforts were barely mentioned, except in a wistful way about what ‘should’ be done. 
Several international NGOs in Marsabit are financed to undertake peace activities, receiving 
funds from USAID and the European Union, but local people do not have a great deal of 
understanding of what they do, nor do they have much confidence that these projects are 
getting to the real problem. Some people speak ironically about NGO efforts to educate 
people about the dangers of violence:  
 
‘One time the people was invited to a meeting by the DO [district officer] and NGOs 
and they were educated about sustaining peace by being shown the negative effects 
of violence on video. There have been several other similar meetings and we have 
participated in several research projects on violence but nothing has really changed.’ 
 
Typically, efforts by unfunded local citizens are more widely regarded. We came across three 
such organisations, all run by women with pragmatic objectives. One women’s organisation 
was praised for its balanced efforts to create dialogue and support victims of violence to gain 
justice, another was successful in gaining membership across the divided ethnic groups and 
a third, a neighbourhood group of housewives, quietly got on with breaking the boycotts on 
neighbourly interaction.  
 
‘There are many members of different communities who have decided to stay in 
peace and they join in different groups. Some members of the communities who lost 
the elections have also decided to join those groups secretly because they also want 
peace.’ 
 
‘We are staying here as a settlement. That is why we do not want problems with our 
neighbours.’ 
 
The problem with these initiatives, however, is that while they create an important drag on 
the levels of revenge, they have little traction on the underlying rhizomes of power. While 
perhaps slowing the rate of violence, they are not able to undermine its persistence. Politics 
not only fuels the violence, but also undermines the citizen-led peace processes: 
 
‘Last week, we tried bringing the communities together… At the meeting, we agreed 
to live in peace. We asked ourselves what the major problem was, and agreed that it 
was all brought in by the political leaders. We then went ahead and selected religious 
leaders, and decided that they should bring together the Moyale, Marsabit North Horr 
and Laisamis Members of Parliament, the county governor, the deputy governor and 
the county representatives to a meeting to settle their scores and bring peace. We 
also selected one Gabra elder, four Borana elders, two Burji elders, two Rendille 
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elders and the religious leaders, who were four Christian leaders and four Muslim 
leaders. We told the Catholic bishop, who was one of the selected Christian leaders, 
and the head of the Muslim Council here, to call the politicians and have them to say 
what their problems were and then get back to us as the communities. Yesterday, I 
met one of the elders and asked him of the progress. He said that one of them 
[religious leaders] had refused to get the politicians together. I asked him why and he 
said that he did not know. I told him that he and the other leaders that were selected 
should go to him and know what went wrong because it might not be that he refused 
to get the politicians together. I told him that if it is true that he refused, and he keeps 
refusing, they should go to the county commissioner to report. The county 
commissioner had said during the meeting that if any politician refused to attend the 
meeting, he should be informed so as to take action. We are still waiting to hear from 
them about that.’  
5.4 Committees and declarations 
Since the 1990s, and drawing on an old tradition of elder-managed peace negotiations in 
resolving inter-communal wars, and on customary systems of law in relation to violent crime, 
a mix of local leaders, ordinary citizens, NGOs, and members of the executive have 
generated formal declarations—in effect an attempt at a local political settlement drawing on 
a long-established system of customary and civilian governance. Contradictory in parts to 
modern state law, but often more successful in creating peace and a sense of justice, these 
agreements are widely appreciated. They are also understood to be limited and flawed 
(Chopra 2008). They include the Modogashe–Garissa Declaration of 2001, which cemented 
agreements based on traditional law between communities from Isiolo, Wajir, Garissa and 
Marsabit with the blessing of the provincial and national security administration, and the 
Maikona–Walda Declaration that effectively ended active hostilities between the Borana and 
Gabra in 2008. 
 
‘After the Maikona Declaration there was a return to normalcy and the Gabra and 
Borana once again started sharing pastures, water, and intermarrying, and doing 
business with each other. A committee was formed with representatives from the two 
communities to deliberate on how to share these resources. Since then there has 
been peace.’  
 
There is some variation in people’s understanding as to how the interventions worked. Some 
understand them as government initiatives, others as arising from within the customary 
institutions of the peoples of the area, others as the initiative of local NGOs. Peace 
committees, originally the initiative of local civic organisations, later taken up by international 
NGOs, and latterly mandated by the administration and linked to district security committees, 
were another element of civic–government cooperation against violence. Some have been 
markedly successful whereas others are criticised for being captured by those who want to 
make money or gain political power (Chopra 2008).  
 
‘A woman’s husband was murdered. Two years after the murder, the Maikona 
Declaration did not work to give her compensation. This is the problem with the court 
system and with declarations. People are not aware that it’s not being used very well. 
The old structures, the elders’ councils, are disabled by the modern structures, the 
district peace committees, chiefs, etc. Now the government benefit from conflict in 
Moyale, with fuel, allowance for 15 vehicles! If we want to go for a peace meeting, 
they say to me, “What is your contribution?” To me, I give it, even if it is unofficial. 
How do they account for it? No they don’t account. We pay because otherwise... it 
might affect our development process. We want normalcy. We want the relationship 
with government.’ 
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‘I have not seen any declaration that works well. I don’t know why they do not work 
well but I think it is because of lack of cooperation on the side of the members of the 
district peace committee or lack of cooperation from the government. We have not 
seen the benefits.’ 
 
In the focus group discussions, people’s appreciation of the successes of the declarations 
relate to the legitimacy of their justice. They deem their failures as relating to weak backing 
from the state, as well as the perennial problem of politicisation of ethnicity. 
 
‘There was a peace committee which was formed by the government. It helped 
reduce the violence because it had representatives from all communities. They would 
get information from all the communities. They went to Modogashe and made a 
declaration to deal with the violence. They agreed that if anyone was killed then the 
accused community was to pay 100 cows for a man and 50 cows for a woman. When 
they brought it here everyone feared.’ 
 
‘The Rendille community had killed a member of the Borana community and they 
paid. However, the Borana community paid many times because they were accused 
more of killing. The late Abdi Tari [former Member of Parliament] saw that the Borana 
community was suffering. The community had even bought cows from Moyale 
because they had to pay the penalty many times. He asked the provincial 
commissioner to abolish the declaration. The commissioner said that she was not in a 
position to abolish the declaration. The MP also told the district commissioner that he 
wanted the declaration abolished and that the elders elected in the peace committee 
were not working. The committee was removed. The elders who were elected after 
that were lazy, especially the Gabra members. Then the Gabra community elders 
complained then those who have been accepted on the committee are just the lazy 
ones who have been rejected by the Gabra community.’ 
 
‘A peace committee has been formed but the violence is still there. There is nothing 
being done to deal with the political violence.’ 
 
In this section we have considered different responses to the violence and asked what 
contribution the responses have made to dealing with the persistence of violence. With police 
and courts able to do little, people remember the peace declarations. The failure of elders to 
put a permanent stop to small wars or to resolve the innocent killings, despite the best efforts 
of many, indicates a loss of power. People say that they cannot afford to follow the 
peacemakers when the peacemakers are powerless to bring either peace or prosperity. 
Elders say that they gain little real support from the state, and they claim that political leaders 
and entrepreneurs undermine their customary legal function. Several elders indicated that 
they often had to abandon their customary peacemaking efforts and, instead, put forward 
their own strong characters as political candidates and accept the functioning of a divisive 
system. 
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6 Analysis of persistent violence 
6.1 Responsibility and blame 
Who is it that is doing the unexplained killings? What sustains the violent clashes? Why is an 
economic boycott an acceptable mode of political action? By many accounts people’s way of 
coping with the intermittent violence has tended to add fuel to the fire, reinforcing the 
likelihood that it will happen again.  
 
Media coverage, NGO reports and government documents often maintain that it is ‘bandits’ 
who kill people on the roads. The implication is that bandits are individual criminals. The 
persistence of violence is attributed to the weakness of the police and courts. These reports 
also encourage the inference that young people kill as a result of a primitive inter-ethnic 
revenge culture that flourishes because they are obsessed with ethnicity and marginalised 
from civilisation. None of our interlocutors believed these explanations for the persistence of 
the killings. They pointed instead to reasons of economic interest and political power. They 
accepted that the tribe is a factor, since in pastoralist law the whole tribe is responsible for 
the crimes of its members, but they did not accept that the problem was primordial ethnicity 
or marginalisation. Instead, they suggested that enmity is being manufactured. 
 
‘There are those who stay on Hula Hula road and kill people. They pretend to be 
Rendille community morans [warriors] and kill along the road so that the Rendille 
morans can be accused… They kill someone on Songa road then go round the forest 
and kill someone in Badasa so that people can start fighting and so that different 
communities can start accusing each other of fighting. At one time people started 
asking why the killing in Songa and Badasa were happening at the same time and 
members of the Rendille community said that they had not revenged at all.’ 
 
‘Sometimes women who get firewood from the forest and young men looking for 
wood to sell are killed then is not easy to say exactly who has killed them. When a 
Rendille community member has been killed then the Borana are accused and when 
a Borana community member is killed then the Rendille community is accused yet 
they are not the only ones in the forest.’ 
 
Without a clear perpetrator to bring to justice, community members take revenge in the name 
of their community and enmity escalates. When enough community members agree to forget 
the past, the revenge attacks will stop, but in time another killing or a whisper of unfair 
dealings will set them off again in a spiral of blame. There do not have to be many killings to 
create whispers that consolidate ethnic identity and result in the formation of voting blocs:  
 
‘When elections near, people from the Gabra, Borana, and Rendille communities die, 
yet we do not know who does the killings. A Borana would be killed, and the Borana 
would blame the Rendille for the killing and vice versa, yet we do not know who did 
the killings.’  
 
Because the killings often involve no theft, and because they go un-investigated – or if 
investigated, unsolved – people also look for other possible explanations. Some point to an 
amorphous group of youth, to whom tribe is unimportant, as killers for hire:  
 
‘There have been several incidents in which people travelling to town or going back 
home are attacked by unknown assailants along the way and killed. In three different 
occasions the attackers have been arrested and they argued that they were at work, 
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because they had been paid by politicians to attack innocent people. They refused to 
provide the specifics or to discuss the issue further.’ 
 
In explaining the small wars, such as the Moyale clashes, the received wisdom is again that 
it is atavism. A standard formulation common in the press and NGO reports suggests that 
ethnic groups are fighting over grazing and water. Among our respondents, this shallow 
reasoning was usually rejected in favour of a political argument. People explained how 
leaders, in battles for the votes that will give them power and wealth, have no compunction in 
inciting revenge attacks, unexplained killings, arson and economic boycotts. One group 
explained how their group selected a strongman as a political candidate. Another group 
explained how politicians create divisions through speeches with double meanings. People 
allege that somebody orders the innocent killings to create racial hatred and fear and split 
communities into voting blocs. 
 
Others point out that criminals who trade guns and have vehicles do well out of small wars:  
 
‘There is spillover from Moyale–Turbi–Marsabit. Beneficiaries are people who sell 
guns and have vehicles for hire. The whole economy of fighting, ferrying people, 
ferrying displaced, gives them benefit. Most conflict is political. The politicians don’t 
speak to each other. The politician has his councillors who guide him. They are the 
announcers who set the people against each other.’ 
 
‘At the moment some teachers are going round the villages collecting KShs. One 
thousand from everybody both male and female to buy guns. They have been doing 
for about three months now - since we are part of them it is difficult for them to hide 
from us. We have informed the police and they are aware of what is happening but 
they are doing nothing. The names of the teachers who are involved in collecting the 
money have already been given to the national security, police and county 
commissioner.’ 
 
Summarising the perspectives of the various people we talked to, we find some generalised 
blame aimed at politicians, the administration, elders and youth, and we also hear that 
everyone and no one is to blame, because the violence (often quite low-level and 
occasionally intense) has become endemic. It is relayed throughout society, as one act of 
violence sets off another, until the origins become obscure and one can only blame the 
political system (Hibou 2006).  
 
People of all kinds take responsibility for keeping the peace. At every level – in local 
neighbourhoods, in schools, in the administration, in politics – there are efforts to keep good 
relations, cool down hate speech and prevent escalation after incidents have occurred. The 
situation is finely balanced, it tips into violence and then tips back into an unstable peace. 
Neither situation is comfortable, and most people that we met were looking for a way out. 
The path towards resolution demands a more nuanced ear to what people are saying about 
how violence works and to what purpose. We will turn to this question in Section 6.2. 
6.2 Four dynamics of persistent violence 
We need to begin by examining the explanations given by the people we interviewed about 
how political entrepreneurs and ordinary citizens have contributed. In this section we 
consider four dynamics that are uppermost in people’s minds, both destructive (i.e. they 
dismantle relationships and arrangements) and productive (i.e. they produce goods, 
relationships and arrangements).  
 
The first dynamic concerns a struggle for the fruits of devolution, even to the extent of 
sabotaging it. The second dynamic concerns the use of violence to shift voter constituencies 
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en masse. The third involves preventing the other group or groups from gaining a share of 
the economy. The fourth encourages the production of ethnic identity through a system of 
economic preference and clientelism. We consider the part each of these appears to play in 
the current transition of power from centralised government to devolved government. 
6.2.1 The political opportunities of devolution 
The first dynamic arises from the structure of political opportunities, which today is shaped by 
devolution. Devolution has dislodged the old balance of power between state, local political 
interests and the customary order. It was a balance of power in which local political 
entrepreneurs had some, but not overwhelming power. In the transition to the new devolved 
political settlement, we see a struggle for power between local political entrepreneurs, each 
with a portion of the old customary institutions and state administrative/executive institutions 
lined up behind. By offering a multiplicity of elected and non-elected positions (governor, 
county assembly members, members of the county cabinet, etc.), devolution has vastly 
increased the monetary value of local politics and, in the citizens’ view, substantial power is 
now in the politicians’ grasps.  
 
In Marsabit the voters whose candidates lost the election were surprised and disaffected by 
the scale of their loss. Since the new county government appears to offer a greater 
opportunity for allocation of assets than had been the case with the centralised 
administration of earlier years, the losers say that they feel especially aggrieved. Before 
devolution it would not have been possible to take one’s local government to court or 
impeach the local leadership, but today’s devolved government structures are subject to new 
rules. If a county is failing, the constitution allows for the central government to dissolve the 
local government and institute proceedings for a new set of elections. Some groups in 
Marsabit talk of ‘making the county ungovernable’.  
 
‘It’s in the constitution. The continuation of this county government without sharing 
resources, promoting conflict, they will have to weigh. Is it good for people to keep 
killing? Marginalising each other? It will be a weighing machine. In case where there 
is no security then they can dissolve the county government.’ 
 
‘Three communities together got the post of governor and the other community has 
not accepted. They do not want the county government but want to be under the 
central government because they do not want the governor.’ 
 
‘This was the first time that they were losing in political elections and subsequently 
they vowed to make the county ungovernable.’ 
 
In one way this strategy is a non-violent one because it aims to use the courts and the 
constitution to achieve its ends, but it is associated with the violence of hate speech, boycott 
and ethnic essentialism. 
6.2.2 Manipulation of constituency populations 
The second dynamic relates to an old practice of changing the ethnic balance of wards and 
constituencies and changing the size of voting blocs. People explain that when a small war 
or series of revenge attacks causes thousands of people to flee from one area to another, 
voting blocs are disrupted. Even without direct violence, threats and rumours are often 
enough to shift people from one place to another in advance of an election, changing the 
pattern of the vote. It is widely alleged that political leaders have been making identity cards 
available to residents on both sides of the international border for many years. These 
residence documents help secure access to education in Kenya, and security and aid in 
Ethiopia, but they also help political leaders in their struggles for power. As elections 
approach, agencies report on how arson attacks on villages result in large numbers of 
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displaced people moving en masse across constituency borders, including across the 
international border. They head for the houses of their relatives and swell the numbers of 
their ethnic group in that location. 
 
‘The political leaders chosen by the people are warlords. The people here would not 
elect anyone who likes peace. They elect people who are good at speaking against 
other communities. They like such people because they would speak for them. They 
also feel that such leaders would liberate them from what we don’t know, and help 
them have the power to take up and own every place where there are good pastures. 
They look for people who promote violence to be elected as leaders. They also look 
at resources like the Community Development Fund [CDF]. They may plan to using 
the CDF to buy guns and arm themselves. These are the kind of rumours that we get 
here.’ 
 
‘He also brought several of his ethnic group from Ethiopia and organised for them to 
obtain Kenyan ID cards so that they vote for him. That is how the population of his 
group increased and they came to dominate politics in the constituency.’ 
 
The killings and hate speech create fear and genuine suspicion of the ‘other’. The only option 
is to cluster together with your own people, who you can trust, do business with and vote for. 
It becomes increasingly logical to use violence against the other communities, especially 
since they are using it against you.  
 
‘The last elections brought things to the fore. The REGABU coalition was used to 
oppose Borana, particularly when it came to the governorship. This broke the camel's 
back. Huqa Jatani, a Gabra, was elected governor, but Borana refused to accept this. 
A month ago there were clashes in Moyale. Gabra had come to settle there. Borana 
tried to evict them. The Burji suffered most, particularly business people. Two trucks 
were burned, shops looted. Burji live in a certain area called Manyatta. Those who 
had mansions in the Borana area saw them burnt down, a primary school was burnt. 
It was them who were very hard hit, though the conflict was initially between Borana 
and Gabra. It could have been payback for them joining REGABU. It is normally the 
elders who make alliances and decide which candidate to put forward. Normally it is 
the elders who will come together to reconcile after these conflicts. Previously the 
Burji and Borana had had minor conflicts in Moyale. It never went to killing. But this 
time it completely got out of control. There was a rape, and rampage... This time it 
completely went out of control. It might take a generation to resolve.’ 
 
The phenomenon of divisive speech is common not just in Marsabit, but across Kenya. 
Several authors point at the political discourse of high-level politicians, in particular when 
they seek to manipulate ethnic identities for the sake of mobilising constituencies. They 
report how public speeches, often those in local languages, play into the fears of the 
population for the ethnic other and accuse the rival political elites of seeking total control 
(Kagwanja 2009). 
6.2.3 Clientelism and reward 
Relatively low levels of targeted violence have a direct effect on the formation of voter blocs, 
according to our respondents. When divisive speech escalates, neighbours stop talking to 
one another and people boycott each other’s businesses; they blame other ethnic groups 
and ethnic divisions harden. At this point, when it comes to a vote, there is really very little 
choice; you have to vote for the person from your own clan or ethnic group. When a child of 
one ethnic group is killed while passing along a road that runs through the territory of 
another, the killing sets off a spiral of blame and a further hardening of ethnic political 
identity. Every person we met in Marsabit described violence in terms of its ethnic effect. 
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Almost everyone referred to ethnicity as a proxy for political gains and losses. It seems that 
most people feel constrained to vote in ethnic blocs; so vital are the opportunities accruing to 
the winning side. 
 
In this system politicians achieve their vote-banks and they appear to have done nothing out 
of order, save to having made speeches that could, in a certain light, be interpreted as 
ethnically divisive. The tendency to vote in tribal blocs will appear to be primordial ethnic 
division arising from the atavism of the masses, and leaders will claim that it is not their 
politics that are to blame. The political culture of rewarding ethnic blocs has been resilient 
over the decades of the evolving political settlement. Politicians across Kenya strengthen 
their own position and that of their parties with strategic use of ethnicity and invest heavily in 
consolidating personal ties to the highest echelons of government (Mueller 2011). It is not 
only the big political leaders who hand out positions, but everyone. Local business people, 
for example, find it normal to make and fulfil promises to tribespeople, while excluding non-
allied groups. The benefits of patronage spread everywhere, even as they tend to 
accumulate among the better off. 
 
Such promises would not work for long if political positions were not key to the distribution of 
government resources. Repeatedly, our focus group participants and interviewees explained 
their belief that the new incumbents of the county government would be distributing positions 
in a way that would reward those who voted for them, while also trying to pacify those who 
did not vote for them, all with one eye on the next elections in 2017. They explained the 
pressure that voters would put on leaders to ‘pay’ for the votes they had received, and they 
explained how the losing side would seek ways to intimidate the new leaders, using 
economic boycotts and demonstrations to stoke communal fears and set neighbours against 
one another. The members of the community that lost the elections pointed out the 
unfairness of their allocation of employment and positions in the executive, their exclusion 
from contracts, casual labour opportunities and catering, and the vulnerability of their people 
who are employed as nurses and teachers to losing their jobs. Others noted the difficult 
position that the governor was in, facing so many contradictory demands. Yet others pointed 
out the powers of Members of Parliament in influencing the distribution of monies from the 
constituency development fund and education bursaries.  
 
‘Most recent was the demonstrations after the leaders were elected. The losing party 
demonstrated against the governor. They demonstrated because they said they did 
not get equal positions in the county government. They say that they have been side-
lined. To me, they want more positions because they are the majority community. 
However, every community ought to get something in the county government. At one 
time, they sent SMSs that said that there was no equality in the county positions. The 
text message read: “This community got 27, this one got seven, this one got six, ours 
got four and the other one got one. The county got KShs 243m. The renovation of the 
governor’s office was allocated KShs 88m; purchase of vehicles got KShs 93m; a 
borehole project sunk in the Kenya–Ethiopia border, which is a year 2017 campaign 
strategy, took KShs 58m”. This was a message that was sent to everyone. I got it 
from a friend, who sent it to me. He got it from a mysterious number.’ (Elder) 
 
‘In our current situation we cannot have peace. We have been sidelined in 
employment and other resources and there can be no peace.’ 
 
To many Kenyans, elections have become a zero-sum ethnic game in which the one who 
loses can lose everything, including access to any state resources and livelihood 
opportunities. The discourse of the political elites only confirms this idea as it serves their 
interest, and it is increasingly presented as the truth as elections approach. Politicians are 
seen as distributors of private goods rather than fair mediators of public goods. Ultimately, 
voters want someone from their ethnic group to be the president as this guarantees them a 
26 
 
share of the national cake. This explains why leaders and voters will use all means to get in 
power (Mueller 2011). The logic of violent clientelism has a remorseless quality as 
opportunities are wrested from one group to another, or dominated by one group and all 
others must come in supplication.  
 
‘When we do elections we have to be one tribe, in spite of the fact that we are 
actually 15 clans. When you find that somebody from your tribe, but from another clan 
has won an election, you find that they do not do anything for the other clan. Every 
time there is an election it happens. So whenever the election is through, the war 
starts. If the person from my clan didn’t get in my people don't get any employment. 
We also want ours to go through and not anybody else. That is one of the problem 
areas.’  
6.2.4 Economic division 
The economy of Marsabit County is not particularly complex. Its rural areas produce millions 
of valuable livestock, some crops and a few other items such as charcoal and forest goods. 
Its towns host transport, livestock trade, retail and wholesale businesses, and basic services. 
There is a substantial, but unmeasured, trade in arms and also in stolen livestock. The 
economy is expanding, but it does not appear to be expanding as fast as the population. 
Young people are competing hard for economic opportunities and good jobs, and many fail 
to find anything. They do not compete alone, but with the support of their relatives and clans-
people in ways that can easily tip into violence and criminal activity, although they do not 
always do so. The mode of competition is not a meritocracy, but a question of positioning, 
bargaining and purchasing of opportunity.  
 
The amount of money that can be extracted from government is one source of economic 
competition. The budget allocation for Marsabit County for the year 2013/14 is KShs 3.906 
bn10 (GBP £31m). This represents a substantial asset in jobs and contracts. It includes 
positions in the county executive, jobs in the county administration, occasional employment 
(such as cooking for a government event), construction contracts and even kickbacks, and 
physical infrastructure and services that benefit particular communities. The KShs 3.9bn 
figure may denote a potential rather than an actual spend, but it indicates the scale of 
opportunity. The enthusiasm for the political process leading to control of county positions 
indicates the importance of these assets and the degree to which they are, or appear to be, 
in the gift of county leaders.  
 
There are few people in Marsabit who can afford to ignore the potential of promised jobs and 
contracts. Being aligned to the political and administrative powers in the county also appears 
to offer protection to those involved in criminal activities such as gun-running and cattle 
rustling.  
 
‘If there were no tribalism and clanism and I were qualified, I would get a job at the 
county government. As it is, I cannot get contracts if I or my community never voted 
for a certain leader. Look at the way in which bursaries are awarded to students. 
They are given according to the tribes that the students come from. They favour 
some people. Even projects funded by the constituency development fund go to the 
group who supported their tribesman for the position of Member of Parliament. There 
are also those that benefit from the violence in this area. They are the individuals who 
maybe stole livestock during the violence from the other communities. They would 
have benefited because they would have more livestock.’ 
 
In November 2013, more than seven months after the new governor of Marsabit had taken 
up power, he had yet to announce who had been appointed to some 42 government posts in 
                                                             
10 Government of Kenya, Commission on Revenue Allocation, County Budgets 2013/14, www.crakenya.org. 
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the new county headquarters in Marsabit town. We were told that despite his genuine efforts, 
he could not persuade the different groups to agree on quotas. These 42 posts, some of 
them quite minor, were the subject of unremitting speculation and, for the governor, 
enormous difficulty and pressure from every side. Various attempts had been made to set up 
a county cabinet balancing the different ethnic interests, but the losing side had been 
dissatisfied, the winning coalition expected the lion’s share and the talks faltered and stalled. 
Within a single ethnic group there were also vitriolic disputes as single clans tried to occupy 
the majority of positions, angering other clans.  
 
‘Since the government was elected people do not get jobs. There is no peace being 
talked about while all the communities are not being consulted.’ 
6.3 A violent system? 
Pre- and post-election violence in 2013 may not have been as overt as it was in 2008, but it 
remains acute in Marsabit, in particular because it seems that it has become embedded in 
day-to-day life. Unexplained killings, arson, economic boycotts and hate speech have 
become normal hazards. With too little support and every reason to act violently themselves, 
the police are unable to investigate and the courts do not play an effective role in securing 
lasting and consistent justice. The violence is apparently stimulated in the struggle for power, 
and patronage is enlisted to keep hold of power.  
 
It is probable that Marsabit is not unique within the political system of Kenya. While the local 
political settlement is using violence and economic rewards as a method of reproducing 
power, scholars have documented a similar pattern at the national level and in different 
counties (Wa Gīthīnji and Holmquist 2012; Kanyinga and Long 2012; Kagwanja 2009; 
Kagwanja and Southall 2009; Kanyinga 2009). It is reasonable to suggest that the local and 
national levels reinforce one another.  
 
The four dynamics elaborated above reveal an interlocking system of economic, political and 
social competition. They show how rooted the violence is into the everyday concerns and 
struggles of almost every stratum of the society of Marsabit town. They demonstrate how in 
responding to violence many people end up helping it to persist. The violence operates in 
such a way as to constantly undermine any positive institutional initiative that may try to 
amend the system.  
 
In her exploration of techniques of political and economic power in Tunisia, Béatrice Hibou 
(2006) distinguishes two modes of political technique embedded in everyday economic 
mechanisms. The first is a productive technique: concrete patronage and advancement for 
supporters, or promises thereof. The positive technologies of power are about offering 
followers inclusion (in the Kenyan case along ethnic lines) in all the goods that can come 
from closeness to the source of jobs, contracts and the ability to outcompete rivals. The 
negative technologies of power are violent: in the Marsabit case they include killings, small 
wars, economic exclusion and hate speech. They create the fear that keeps people voting for 
partisan politicians. If such a system becomes embedded then it can persist relatively easily.  
Incentives for violence in Marsabit emerge as stronger than those that call for non-violence. 
What can change the equation? The political gains are large and the threat of sanction fairly 
small. The once powerful customary court system appears to not function well in preventing 
and punishing politically-instigated attacks, and the state administration, police and courts 
are similarly failing to resolve the issue. This is not to say that these institutions are having no 
effect; to the contrary, they do help to limit the violence by offering a structure that non-
violent actors can align with, but they are not stopping it. We will conclude by asking how 
they might change their tactics. 
28 
 
7 Conclusion: the political settlement and the 
 law 
 
The citizens of Marsabit town who speak in this study reject the commonly held notion that 
violence across northern Kenya is about an ancient tradition in the neglected borderlands, 
whose locus is a poor, wild and backward population. Our interlocutors also made it clear 
that almost none of the persistent violence is individual crime. They further explained that 
democratic institutions are distorted by clientelism and citizens feel forced by their economic 
vulnerability to join in. If policies and programmes for quelling persistent violence are based 
on unrealistic imaginaries, they will not be successful. This final section will ask if a more 
realistic assessment might be useful in devising alternative approaches.  
 
It was Walter Benjamin’s (1921) insight that new states always come into being through 
violence, since violence is needed to do away with old powers and make new laws. Given 
that all of our interlocutors labelled the violence in Marsabit as political, it suggests that we 
should see it as part of the latest political settlement: devolution’s state-building process. It is 
marked by attempts by political entrepreneurs to take charge of this new state by imposing 
their own version of violence, i.e. their own law. With the support of most of society, they are 
also using patronage and ethnic vote blocs to compete to be the makers and guarantors of 
the new (violent) law. Fortunately it is a transitional phenomenon. Once we stop generalising 
about ethnic rivalry, primordial raiding and root and branch corruption, we can look at the 
political struggle in its actuality and find ways of challenging its modus operandi.  
 
What policy recommendation can be made for reducing and controlling the violence in the 
transition to a new political settlement? Does the political settlement have to be so marked by 
violence? Previous studies of violence in Kenya have made recommendations to reform 
electoral, parliamentary, security and judicial institutions, but as yet these efforts have not 
resolved the problem, perhaps because they do not deal with the competition for control of 
the law which violence represents. Others have suggested increasing support to community-
based initiatives that might bypass political leaders and give backing to genuine efforts by 
poorer people, but these efforts have consistently failed to counter the strength of political 
actors.  
 
The women of one neighbourhood on the mountain had an answer:  
 
‘There is no way words of wananchi [the people] can get heard. Perhaps we should 
boycott elections. That might bring peace.’ 
 
The suggestion contains a useful insight: the idea of the separation of politics and the law. 
Even though separation of powers may seem unlikely, since the national setup, as practiced, 
does not appear to promote independence of the law, we argue that it would be a fruitful 
avenue to pursue. The new constitution appreciates separation of powers, but legislation has 
yet to put in place adequate implementation modalities to make it happen. The reason for 
this is that the double security that should be provided by dispersing state power both 
vertically and horizontally does not automatically avoid local capture, since it assumes a 
‘constraining framework of public norms’ (Roschmann, Wendoh and Ogolla 2012: 13, 20). 
Such an assumption is overly optimistic given the shape and history of Kenya’s political 
settlement. 
 
Recognising that no one institution or group is strong enough alone to wrest the law from 
politics in Marsabit and similar locations, we propose that devolution policy should 
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incorporate a programme of systematic restorative justice. Restorative justice is a mode of 
law that gives precedence to resolution over punishment. Such a programme should aim to 
create formal and funded cooperation between state and customary legal institutions and 
include genuine citizen’s groups, such as the women’s neighbourhood groups met during this 
study. These combined institutions should be empowered to deal with innocent killings, 
arson, eviction, hate speech and small wars as they arise. The process should involve 
detailed discussions as to points of moral and legal alignment, support collaborative 
investigation of any violence, and should make and implement formal rules and sanctions for 
dealing with cases. Only by taking control of the law will the pro-peace elements of society 
also take control of the violence. 
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